天津大學(xué)PPT模板.ppt
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目錄 1 Introduction2 LiteratureReview3 Model3 1RepairProcessandInventoryPolicy3 2CostStructure3 3InformationStructure3 4ContractTypesandPayoffs3 5SignalingGame4 Benchmark First BestUnderCompleteInformation5 SignalingwithVerifiableInventory5 1Resource BasedContract5 2Performance BasedContract6 SignalingwithUnverifiableInventory6 1Resource BasedContract6 2Performance BasedContract7 Extensions EfficiencyEnhancementStrategies7 1EndogenizingInventoryVerifiability7 2PoolingInventoryAcrossMultipleBuyers8 Conclusions 1 Introduction 供貨商 買方 產(chǎn)品 PBC RBC 可靠性私有信息 使用 備用庫存 維護 背景介紹 文獻回顧 2 LiteratureReview PBCforoutsourcedservicesasymmetricinformationinoperationsmanagementtheuseofwarrantiesasasignalingmechanism 建模 3 Model 3 1RepairProcessandInventoryPolicyN identicalcopies B inventorybackorder s inventory TheexpectedbackordersinsteadystateisAvailabilityisequalto 建模 3 2CostStructureEachtimeaproductfailureoccurs thebuyerincursafixedcostr 0 Thebuyer sexpectedcostisequaltoThevendor sexpectedcostisequalto 建模 3 3InformationStructureWeassumethattheproductofferedbythevendorisoneoftwopossibletypes LorH whereLdenoteslowreliabilityandHdenoteshighreliability Hazardrateordering 危險率序 Excesswealthordering 剩余財富序 建模 3 4ContractTypesandPayoffsWecanwritethebuyer sexpectedpayoffasThevendor sexpectedpayoffisgivenbyRBC PBC 建模 3 5SignalingGameWeassumethatthevendor whopossessesprivateinformationaboutthereliabilityofanewlydevelopedproduct choosescontracttermsandproposesthemtothebuyer Thebuyerthenacceptsthecontracttermsifhisexpectedpayoffexceedsanoutsideoptionvaluedat WeseekaperfectBayesianequilibrium PBE thatisalsorenegotiation proof 建模 4 Benchmark First BestUnderCompleteInformation Giventhevendortype thefirst bestoutcomeisobtainedbysolvingtheoptimizationproblem 建模 5 SignalingwithVerifiableInventory Wenowconsiderthesettinginwhichthevendorpossessesprivateinformationaboutproductreliability 5 1Resource BasedContractThevalueof setbythevendorinhercontractmayrelayinformationaboutwhetherornottheproductisreliable 建模 5 1Resource BasedContract Insummary successfulsignalingbythereliablevendorispossibleunderRBCwhenherinventorychoiceisverifiable butitcomesatacostsincethevendorhastoleavepositivesurplustothebuyer 建模 5 2Performance BasedContract Therefore successfulsignalingbythereliablevendorcanbedoneunderbothRBCandPBCwhentheinventoryisverifiable However PBCpresentsanadvantagebecauseitsrisksharingmechanismismoreamenabletosignalingthanthatofRBC 建模 6 SignalingwithUnverifiableInventory 6 1Resource BasedContractWithinventorynolongerverifiable thepayofffunctionsforthevendorandthebuyerunderRBCremainthesameasthoseoftheverifiableinventorycase Anunderinvestmentininventorycauseseconomicinefficiency 建模 6 2Performance BasedContractThereliablevendoroverinvestsininventoryinequilibrium Overall wefindthattheinteractionbetweenthevendor sdiscretionaryinventorychoiceandhersignalingincentivecreatessubtledynamicsthatimpacttherelativeefficiencyofafter salesservicecontractsinnontrivialways 建模 Whichcontracttypewillthereliablevendorprefer Thus thereliablevendorfindsthattheabilitytosignalhertypewithPBCmorethancompensatesforthecostassociatedwithoverinvestmentininventoryandanybenefitpresentedbyRBC whichdoesnotimproveuponapoolingoutcome 擴展 7 Extensions EfficiencyEnhancementStrategies EndogenizingInventoryVerifiabilityPoolingInventoryAcrossMultipleBuyers 結(jié)論 8 Conclusions Suggestions Thekeytobringefficiencytothesupplychainisinventorytransparency Analternativewaytobringefficiencyistoutilizeinventorypooling incasethevendormanagesinventoriesacrossmultiplebuyers 謝謝- 1.請仔細閱讀文檔,確保文檔完整性,對于不預(yù)覽、不比對內(nèi)容而直接下載帶來的問題本站不予受理。
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